輔仁法學第56期

私人費用在所得稅法上的意義介於天秤的兩端，一邊作為可支配的所得運用，並作為課稅的基礎；另一邊則為不可支配的所得運用，並在課稅禁區的範圍內。後者，德國稅捐實務以憲法生存權、家庭以及婚姻的保障為基礎，認為滿足稅捐義務人及其家庭成員最低生存必要的費用必須從所得稅的稅基中扣除。然該立論基礎以及重要性並未普遍獲得我國稅捐實務之承認，相反的，不斷藉由立法者的形成自由或是稅捐機關的行政行為，徹底侵犯稅捐義務人的稅捐自由，此透過歷年相關大法官解釋以及我國所得稅法免稅額、扣除額的規定可稽。甫施行的納稅者權利保護法第4條，在其施行細則第3條的解釋適用下亦無法達成其原制定之立法目的。因此，本文在此背景下展開，並藉由德國法的發展，探討基於憲法的價值而在所得稅法上必須作為「不可避免的」費用項目以及與此相關的立法者的類型化權能以及裁量自由的界限。

The meaning of private costs in the income tax law is between the ends of the scales, as the use of disposable income and as the basis for taxation; the other side is the use of unencumbered income, and as a restricted area of taxation. In this context, the German tax law from the Constitution of the right to life, that meet the tax obligor and his family members to the minimum subsistence necessary costs must be deducted from the income tax base. However, the basis of the Constitutional Protection and the specific design of the system of income tax exemption and other deductions are not universally recognized by Taiwan's tax practice. On the contrary, the legislators use the formation of freedom, complete violate taxpayer which has the right not to be taxed. Therefore, this research project explores what is meant by the constitutional value the “unavoidable” costs in the income tax law, and the limits of authority and discretion space of legislators.

壹、前言
貳、主觀淨額所得原則的憲法基礎
一、私人費用的憲法評價
二、量能課稅原則的具體化
三、不可支配的所得理論
參、主觀淨額所得原則在立法層次的實現
一、主觀費用扣除要件外部體系的一致性
二、主觀費用扣除額的要求
三、立法者類型化空間的憲法界限
肆、私人費用的憲法評價在所得稅法上的展現
一、概說
二、最低生存費用
（一）個人以及家庭的最低生存保障
（二）所得稅基本免稅額與社會救助法的關係
（三）我國目前現況
三、特別的最低生存費用
（一）與最低生存費用類似的費用支出：預防照顧保險費用
（二）其他必然的扶養費用
（三）實現基本權的重要費用
（四）額外支出的費用
（五）混合因果關係的費用
伍、結論

我國衛生主管機關藉由公共衛生監測與健康補助計畫，自醫療院所蒐集大量民眾個人資料。公共衛生監測係長期、廣泛、系統性地蒐集資料，除為了立即的公共衛生目的外，並可能長期保存並利用於政策評估或研究。我國公共衛生監測下之強制記名通報，雖然大部分均有法律依據，但在本研究發現的28項監測中，仍有3項規範依據中未明確提及通報系統的建置；而且，僅有6項載明蒐集目的，並普遍無法確實達成授權明確性的要求。另一方面，主管機關透過與醫院訂定行政契約或當事人申請健康補助，獲得大量病患的個人資料，但甚少告知當事人通報事實與蒐集個人資料後的利用情況。我國個人資料保護法對公務機關的個人資料行為規範鬆散，主管機關在組織法的職權下，無須作用法的授權，即可蒐集、處理、利用，甚或蒐集目的外利用民眾的個人資料，甚或建置資料庫提供外部研究使用。本研究透過訪談與規範分析，以了解我國醫療院所受記名通報之實務與規範情況，最後建議修正個人資料保護法，強化對公務機關蒐集、處理、利用個人資料之規範密度。

Public health authorities collect large amounts of personal information from medical institutions through name-based reporting; this collection is facilitated by public health surveillance and medical subsidy plans. Public health surveillance involves the continual, general, and systematic collection of personal information. Collected information is not only used in efforts to achieve immediate public health goals but also preserved for long-term usage such as policy evaluation and research. In this study, we observed 28 name-based-reporting systems used in public health surveillance in Taiwan. Ostensibly, all these systems are legally authorized; however, three have not been mentioned in any legal articles. Only the six of these systems state the purposes for data collection in the authorization provisions. Most of the authorization laws do not include required details regarding system regulation. On the other hand, public health authorities offer subsidies to medical institutions and patients through contracts and receive enormous amounts of personal medical information from reimbursement. Under the Personal Information Protection Act in Taiwan, the government agencies possess the authority to collect and process people’s personal information from organization laws. In the absence of specific regulations, government agencies may legally use collected data of relevant individuals without informed consent for purposes not specified in the data collection terms. For example, information may be used to establish a database for academic research. This study explored the regulations and practices of name-based reporting in Taiwan by conducting interviews and analyzing the relevant laws and regulations. The results of this study suggest that the government should revise the Personal Information Protection Act to establish comprehensive regulations for name-based reporting.

壹、緒論
貳、研究背景、研究方法與材料
一、記名通報、公共衛生監測與規範議題
二、研究方法與材料
參、公共衛生監測與強制記名通報
一、公共衛生監測與記名通報之類型與項目
二、公共衛生監測之法律依據與規範情況
（一）通報內容
（二）蒐集個人資料之特定目的
（三）資料庫的設置
（四）委託或成立機構辦理監測
（五）授權規定與法規命令
（六）個人資料之利用規定與保存
三、我國公共衛生監測規範的法律保留疑義：以出生通報為例
四、告知情況
肆、健康補助計畫與記名通報
伍、爭議問題探討
一、醫療院所記名通報與敏感性個人資料
二、公共衛生監測與法律保留
三、健康補助計畫與告知後同意
四、目的外利用與研究
五、從世界衛生組織之公共衛生監測倫理指引之觀察
陸、結論

監察院聲請黨產條例釋憲案之爭議，本文認為程序上允宜不予受理：首先，大法官歷來職權行使依據的三部法規範皆有行使職權要件之規定，是大審法第5條第1項第1款機關聲請釋憲應以行使職權為聲請釋憲程序之法定核心要件。聲請機關應於聲請書內敘明其提出聲請係基於憲法或法律規定的何種職權之行使，並應進一步陳述其職權行使之內涵，以及其行使職權如何適用系爭有違憲疑義之法律。對於聲請機關行使職權要件之內涵，應由大法官於審查聲請案件時，加以認定及闡明。其次，本案主要涉及監察院的調查權，依釋字第325號、第729號解釋，監察院之調查權，係行使彈劾、糾舉、糾正等監察職權之手段，僅係監察權行使之方式之一。憲法規定對監察院行使調查權之內涵，乃因公務人員或行政機關之工作及設施有違法失職情事，對之進行調查，如有具體且明確之事證，方得以對之提出彈劾案、糾舉案或糾正案。惟本件依聲請書所陳，調查權行使之事實及結論，無法得出調查權之行使，乃合於憲法規定調查權行使目的、功能及對象。再由「行使職權，適用法律」之界定而論，系爭黨產條例顯然並非監察院行使調查權所「涉及」或「適用」之法律，毋寧係調查權行使之「目的」及「客體」。本件聲請意旨未見合於聲請釋憲程序法定要件「行使職權」之論述，既不符憲法規定調查權行使之內涵，且調查權行使並未適用系爭條例，本件聲請核與本款之聲請要件有所不合，程序上允宜不予受理。司法院大法官亦於民國107年10月05日第1482次會議中，議決本件「監察院聲請解釋黨產條例違憲部分」程序不受理。

This paper argues that procedurally the Constitutional Court of the Judicial Yuan should dismiss the petition for constitutional interpretation submitted by the Control Yuan on the Act of Governing the Settlement of Ill-Gotten Assets of Political Parties. First, the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act, Article 1, Section1, Clause 1 states that the core of the constitutional judicial proceedings on the petition of an agency should be centered on the exercising authority of a petitioning institution. The petitioning agency should describe the type of authority exercised in the petition statement based on the Constitution or relevant regulations as well as elucidate the structure of petitioning agency and address legal concerns pertaining to the constitutional judicial review. The Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan would then set to review the petition content submitted by the petitioning agency. Secondly, this issue involves the investigating power of the Control Yuan. Facts and conclusions described in the petition reveals that execution of investigating power cannot be derived or inferred which is incongruent with the purpose, function, and object of investigating power according to the Constitution. Thirdly, in regard to “executing authority with applicable law”, the above-mentioned constitutional act and article disassociates the Control Yuan to exercise relevant investigating power with applicable law pertaining to the Act of Governing the Settlement of Ill-Gotten Assets of Political Parties as the Control Yuan is neither the function nor the object of such investigating power. From the constitutional procedures perspective, such petition should be rejected as it does not meet the requirement of exercising authority of petitioning agency for constitutional interpretation because of its ill-founded content and inapplicable legal investigating power. On October 5th, 2018, the council (No. 1482) of Grand Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan decided not to accept the petition submitted by the Control Yuan.

壹、聲請事由及釋憲程序審查之基礎
一、聲請事由：主旨、目的及緣由
二、憲法訴訟程序之列舉原則與現行大法官釋憲程序
貳、機關聲請法令釋憲程序之探討
一、立法沿革與釋憲實務概述
二、大法官釋憲實務中機關聲請法令釋憲之程序及客體分析
（一）聲請釋憲書與大法官解釋皆概括以機關聲請釋憲之程序聲請及受理
（二）依聲請釋憲書與大法官解釋內容得認係法令違憲與憲法疑義之解釋兩項程序及客體類型兼具之解釋
（三）機關概括以大審法第5條第1項第1款規定聲請，大法官受理後限縮解釋客體
（四）小結
參、機關聲請釋憲程序之「行使職權」
一、大法官歷來職權行使依據的三部法規範及107年憲法訴訟法皆有行使職權要件之規定
二、實務上機關聲請及大法官解釋均未重視行使職權之要件
三、學理討論
四、本文見解：行使職權應為機關聲請釋憲程序之法定核心要件
五、本件釋憲聲請難謂符合行使職權，適用法律之要件
（一）監察院之調查權，係行使彈劾、糾舉及糾正權之手段
（二）本件調查權之行使，並無適用系爭條例
肆、結論
一、本件監察院聲請釋憲案允宜不予受理
二、大法官第1482次會議議決不受理監察院聲請釋憲案

我國公司法雖然對於董事之資格有所要求，且訂有董事解任之規定，以淘汰不適任之董事，惟在現行法制下，無論是股東會決議解任或透過法院裁判解任董事，皆有一定的難度，且實務上屢屢發生不適任之董事遭解任後，仍然掌控公司經營大權之情事。相較於我國，英國對於不適任之公司董事有所謂董事失格制度，限制其於一定時間內擔任公司負責人之資格或參與公司經營，使不適任之董事可迅速被排除於公司經營者範圍之外，以生嚇阻之效。本文將檢視我國現行公司法有關董事資格與淘汰機制之規範，並分析英國公司董事失格制度之制度設計與實務運作，進而探討我國引進此一制度的可能性以及相關的法律設計，以供我國未來建立該制度之參考。

Although Taiwan’s Company Act requires directors meet certain criteria and has a mechanism for removal of directors, problems regarding removal of unfit directors remains. In contrast, the director disqualification, introduced into British law by the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, applies where a person is found to be unfit to manage the affairs of a company. They may then be disqualified from acting as a company director for a fixed period of time. In the UK, disqualification of directors is seen as part of corporate governance because it aims at ensuring that people who are considered to be unfit are disqualified from serving in positions of influence as far as the governance and managing of companies are concerned. This article will examine current criteria to be a director and the mechanism for removal of directors in Taiwan. Then, it will discuss the mechanism of director disqualification in the UK. Finally, this article will analyze the feasibility of introducing the directors disqualification system into Taiwan. If the introduction of directors disqualification into Taiwan is practicable, this article will further offer its regulatory design.

壹、前言
貳、我國公司法有關董事資格與淘汰機制之規範
一、公司法有關董事資格之規定
二、公司法有關淘汰董事之機制
參、英國董事失格制度
一、失格事由
二、失格宣告聲請權人與失格承諾制度
三、失格期間
四、失格主體之範圍與失格宣告之效果
五、違反之效果
肆、建構我國董事失格制度之思考
一、公司法全盤修正修法委員會之建議
二、本文建議
伍、結論

共有物唯有透過分管行為方能特定利用，於98年7月23日民法第820條修正施行前，「分管契約」與「分管決定」無區別之必要，但修正施行後，兩者之區別即顯重要。分管行為可否多數決？多數決究以「分管契約」或「分管決定」為之較佳？「分管契約」之法律依據為何？「分管契約」與「分管決定」共有物唯有透過分管行為方能特定利用，於98年7月23日民法第820條修正施行前，「分管契約」與「分管決定」無區別之必要，但修正施行後，兩者之區別即顯重要。分管行為可否多數決？多數決究以「分管契約」或「分管決定」為之較佳？「分管契約」之法律依據為何？「分管契約」與「分管決定」兩者之法律效果，不僅在民法第820條第2至4項所設對共有人之保護措施適用上，有其不同外，另在不當得利、侵權行為及物上請求權上，亦有所差異。本文旨在整理民法第820條修正後，實務上關於「分管契約」及「分管決定」之法律見解，分門別類，建立其體系，以釐清上開問題，俾供學界與實務之參考。兩者之法律效果，不僅在民法第820條第2至4項所設對共有人之保護措施適用上，有其不同外，另在不當得利、侵權行為及物上請求權上，亦有所差異。本文旨在整理民法第820條修正後，實務上關於「分管契約」及「分管決定」之法律見解，分門別類，建立其體系，以釐清上開問題，俾供學界與實務之參考。

The thing held in indivision can be specific use only when the decision is made by the majority of co-owners. To distinct differences between “the separate-management of the thing held in indivision by a covenant (separate-management covenant)” and “the separate-management of the thing held in indivision by the majority of co-owners’ decision (separate-management decision)” is unnecessary before the Article 820 amendment to the Civil Law was adopted on July 23, 98th year of the Republic. However, the differences between the two have become significant after the amendment. Can specific use in the thing held in indivision by the majority of co-owners be applicable? Is specific use in the thing held in indivision by the majority of co-owners better by covenant or co-owners’ decision? What is the legal basis for the “separate-management covenant”? The different legal effects between “separate-management covenant” and “separate-management decision” are not only applicable to the protection measures of the co-owners set out in the Article 820 II-IV, but also different in the unjust enrichment, the torts, and the claim in rem. In order to clarify these issues, this article aims to establish an explanation system and to provide reference for the academic and practical after the Article 820 amendment collates the “separate-management covenant” with the “separate-management decision” regarding their individual legal opinions.

壹、前言
貳、分管契約與分管決定區別之實務見解
一、分管可多數決
二、分管不可多數決
參、分管區別之方向
一、分管應得多數決
二、以分管決定可多數決為佳
三、分管契約之依據
肆、分管法律效果之區別
一、民法第820條之權利
二、分管不成之法院介入權
三、不當得利
四、侵權行為
五、無權占有
伍、結論