輔仁法學第55期

Karl Larenz於20世紀的德國法學界中，在民法釋義學與法學方法論上都有重要貢獻，本文則是處理Larenz作為法學方法論者的那一面，關注其如何討論法官與法律之關係這個問題。因其在戰前（納粹時期）與戰後（聯邦德國時期）都有方法論相關的著作，本文將針對其戰前與戰後之法學方法論上的主要主張與命題究竟為何，做一基本入門之介紹，並且比較討論其異同與意義。本文首先將簡短的介紹Larenz的生平，接下來則討論Larenz戰前（納粹時期）的方法論主張，再來，本文將介紹Larenz在戰後（聯邦德國時期）的法學方法論主張。最後，本文將對於Larenz的法學方法論進行一些簡短的評價，來做為結論。
關鍵詞：Karl Larenz、法學方法論、評價法學、納粹、法律漏洞、法續造

Karl Larenz is one of the most important law scholars in Germany of 20th century, and he has great contribution for the Interpretation of civil law and the Methodology of Jurisprudence. This Article would like to introduce his Methodology of Jurisprudence and focus on this issue, how he discusses the problem about the relationship between judge and law. Because he has published in 1938 and in 1960 very important literary work for Methodology of Jurisprudence, this article will discuss these two periods separately and compare their differences and similarities. First introduce this article Larenz’s Biography and literary works. Next discuss this article Larenz’s Methodology of Jurisprudence in 1938 and in 1960. As a conclusion will this article briefly evaluate his Methodology of Jurisprudence.

Keywords: Karl Larenz, Methodology of Jurisprudence, value Jurisprudence, Nazi, Legal Flaw, further build of law

目次
壹、前言
貳、Larenz的生平
一、哥廷根大學時期
二、基爾大學時期
三、慕尼黑大學時期
四、小結
參、戰前的方法論代表：《關於民族法學思考的對象與方法》
一、法律與法的關係
二、如何確定法律有「漏洞」
三、法律之「漏洞」填補：具體化
四、具體化之界限
五、小結
肆、戰後的方法論代表：《法學方法論》
一、法學是評價法學
二、法律解釋學
三、法官法續造之方法
（一）法律內的法續造
（二）超越法律之法續造
四、小結
伍、結論：對Larenz法學方法論之短評

於現代設計而言，如何融合美感與功能特質以呈現出最佳形式，可說是實踐之終極目標；相對地，立法規範歷來偏重設計之美感外觀保護，以致與產業觀點漸行漸遠，並由此衍生出美感／功能二分法之對立觀點。但從結果而論，法律並未真正實現保護美感之規範目的，反倒受制於美感之不確定性與證明困難而製造諸多爭議，不僅美感之要件地位曖昧不明，甚至混淆不同要件間之論證關係，其中又以可見性、功能性及創作性為最。
為解決前揭混亂，關鍵在於如何正確詮釋美感在設計專利保護中之地位，這也是學術及實務鮮少深入談論之議題；是以，本文首從歷史脈絡與文義瞭解設計及法律領域所認知之美感內涵為何，復從立法思維截然不同之美國與歐盟經驗，探究適用謬誤之癥結及可能解套方法，進而在不違反美感概念涵義之前提下，建議我國立法及實務應如何看待美感並提出修正方案。

關鍵詞：美感、視覺魅力、裝飾性、可見性、功能性、新穎性、創作性、獨特性、外觀、設計。

It is the ultimate goal for the modern design activities to combine aesthetic and functional features perfectly and to construct the “optimal form.” However, legislative norms historically have focused on the protection of aesthetic appearance of designs, so distinct from the viewpoint of designer, and it has resulted in “aesthetic/functional dichotomy.” In fact, subject to uncertainty of aesthetics and difficulty of proving, the law itself cannot fulfill the purpose of protecting the aesthetic appearance and causes a lot of controversy. Therefore, the legal status of aesthetic character is unclear and the relationship of various requirements is confused, especially between aesthetics, visibility, functionality and non-obviousness.
In order to solve the issues aforementioned, the key point is how to interpret the legal status of aesthetics in design law properly, which is discussed by scholars and courts rarely. Therefore, the author suggests that firstly it is to discover the concept of “aesthetic” recognized by designers and legislators in the context of history and in the literal sense. Furthermore, based on the different experiences and thinking behind the laws of the United States and European Union, it also needs to identify the critical problems of applying laws and figure out the feasible solutions. Finally, under the premise of not conflicting with the meaning of “aesthetic”, the author provides legislators and courts with several suggestions for interpreting and amending.

Keywords: Aesthetic, Eye Appeal, Ornamentality, Visibility, Functionality, Novelty, Non-obviousness, Individual Character, Appearance, Design

目次
壹、前言
貳、美感在設計制度中之地位
一、立法選擇保護美感之緣由
二、如何定義美感
（一）從字義解釋
（二）從「產品語言理論」解讀
三、保護美感產生之幾點疑問
（一）著作權與專利取向之爭執
（二）美感要件之存廢
（三）美感與功能性之規範關係
（四）保護基礎理論之適當性
參、截然不同的規範立場：以美國與歐盟為例
一、美國觀點：「裝飾性」要件
（一）從無到有的立法轉變
（二）解釋方式未獲共識
（三）裝飾性要件空洞化
二、歐盟觀點：「外觀」中性措辭
（一）擺脫美感的嶄新作法
（二）二分觀點並未消失
肆、我國對於美感之詮釋以及規範檢討
一、從有到無的立法轉變
二、換湯不換藥？「視覺訴求」之真正涵義
三、釐清美感在立法上之真正價值
（一）美感要件退場
（二）體現為客觀之「差異程度」
（三）確立不同要件之獨立論證地位
伍、結論
附表：美國、歐盟及我國關於「美感」之適用情形比較

司法院大法官在第748號解釋中，宣告民法第4編親屬第2章婚姻規定「未使相同性別二人，得為經營共同生活之目的，成立具有親密性及排他性之永久結合關係，於此範圍內，與憲法第22條保障人民婚姻自由及第7條保障人民平等權之意旨有違」。儘管如此，無論是面對與立法者之間的權限分際問題，或是攸關婚姻自由之平等保護如何獲得實現的「『修法』與『專法』之爭」，本號解釋都沒有提供明確的解套線索，反而遺留了巨大的想像空間。本文將分析指出：本號解釋既沒有選擇對現行民法採合憲解釋，讓現行法律在最小的變動下順應憲法對婚姻之平等保護，也沒有指出民法婚姻章之價值預設之所以違憲之理由。更進一步而言，本號解釋站在維護既有社會秩序與基本倫理秩序之立場前提下，解釋拒絕挑明本案所涉及不同價值立場間之利益衝突，使得各種方案得以合憲之姿繼續存在，反而為婚姻自由的具體實踐投下變數。以此而論，透過本號解釋，我國看似省去了德國婚姻平權提倡者走過的那段艱辛而曲折的路途，但事實上，婚姻平權的戰場才正要展開。

關鍵字：婚姻平權、同性婚姻、婚姻自由、平等權、立法形成自由、社會秩序

In its Interpretation No. 748, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court held that “[t]he provisions of Chapter 2 on Marriage of Part IV on Family of the Civil Code do not allow two persons of the same sex to create a permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life. The said provisions, to the extent of such failure, are in violation of constitution’s guarantees of both the people’s freedom of marriage under Article 22 and the people’s right to equality under Article 7.” Nevertheless, this paper argues that the Constitutional Court not only failed to clarify the issues of separation of powers between legislature and judiciary, but also avoided controversies with regard to the way marriage equality is to be realized. Furthermore, since the Constitutional Court was reluctant to deal with the fundamental value conflicts in this case on constitutional grounds, it remains unclear why the said provisions violate the Constitution, and to what extent the legislators are free to amend the law or to enact new laws. Observed this way, marriage equality in Taiwan still has a long way to go.

Keywords: marriage equality, same-sex marriage, right to marry, equal protection, legislative discretion, social order

目次
壹、前言
貳、釋字第748號解釋脈絡下的婚姻自由與立法形成自由
一、同性性傾向者之婚姻自由與平等保護
二、同性性傾向者婚姻自由之具體落實途徑
參、釋字第748號解釋遺留的憲法問題
一、本號解釋為何沒有探討合憲解釋的可能性？
二、本號解釋究竟基於什麼理由認定現行規定違憲？
三、本號解釋到底如何看待立法形成自由？
肆、德國婚姻平權修法工程的啟示
伍、結語